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1 Introduction
Seeking advice by consultancies has increased over the last decades in most
market economies. But, in most cases it is hard to see, why companies
hire consultancies and try not to perform the diligence asked for internally.
Strategic advice is often based on reports from members within the company
and the consultancy only aggregates this information.
We study the decision making of management board of large companies.
On these boards, managers serve as members of a committee asked to aggre-
gate private information whether a certain project should be implemented
or not, i.e. a project increases the expected profit of the firm. These boards
often pay for advice of a consultancy firm but such advice is a close substitute
to their own task. Each manager on the board is in his/her position because
he/she is a good decision maker for the problems involved with the firm and
it is far from obvious that a report by a consultancy is more informative then
the information a single manager could gather.
In the present paper we want to look precisely at this type of consulting
work. Bringing together information to advice a manager or a managerial
board how to decide upon whether a certain project is implemented or not
instead of how to implement a certain project. One reason for the existence
and use of consultancies are economies of scale due to the fact that consultan-
cies performed similar tasks in other companies and the task under question
only infrequently needs to be done in the firm. Thus we do not focus on
the efficient division of labor through consultancies that for example install
a new software in a firm or consult in the case of a merger - where mergers
happen infrequently for the company. Instead we look at classic strategic
consulting. Most bigger firms hire almost permanently consultancies even
for day to day investment and marketing decisions. Most of these decisions
are finally taken by leading managers or managerial boards.
Why do management boards, committees of firms, hire consultants if they
are regarded themselves as experts to make the decisions needed. In this
paper, we want to argue that external opinions serve as a public informative
signal for members of a committee. If career concerns influence the decisions
taken by committee members, especially if there is a value “to be right”,
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then additional public signals can help to avoid a type of herding behavior in
committee decisions. We show, how optimal majority rules are affected by
career motive of members and discuss in how far a public signal can alleviate
the problem as well as what are the costs of such a public signal.
The question is addressed within a standard committee voting model
where members decide on two alternatives. Sah and Stiglitz (1988) applied
such a model. It builds on the general idea of the Condorcet jury theorem
where all members have identical preferences but differ in their ability of mak-
ing correct decisions. Condorcet concludes that decisions derived by a ma-
jority rule are more efficient decision than a decision by a single individuum.
This statement can be seen as one support for democratic institutions not
only in the political process but in economic and private environments as
well.
However, Condorcet’s jury theorem has been come under criticism by
papers introducing strategic voting of committee members.1 Strategic vot-
ing means that committee members do not vote naively but recognize that
their influence is restricted on “pivotal situations”. In this case agents con-
dition their voting strategy on the event to become decisive. Austen-Smith
and Banks (1996) find that under strategic voting sincere voting as assumed
for Condorcet’ss jury theorem is no Nash-equilibrium any more, therefore,
putting a question mark on the validity of Condorcet’s result. Fedderson and
Pesendorfer (1998) find that strategic voting will undermine the efficiency of
the unanimity rule, since a pivotal jury member never votes against all oth-
ers’ private signals, which must be the case if he is in a pivotal position and
others vote sincerely.
While some papers succeeded in reestablishing the theorem even under
strategic voting (Wit ,1998, and McLennan, 1998) the discussion opened the
door to a more detailed evaluation of the jury theorem and indicated that
voting procedures must be designed carefully if members vote strategically.
One of the recent extensions of the standard model, is the idea to allow for
pre-decision deliberation.2
1Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1996,1997,1998) and Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) in-
troduced the concept.
2The following paper analyze the effects of deliberation in voting models: Austen-Smith
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This literature explores that deliberation may serve different tasks. Firstly,
deliberation may serve the purpose to reduce coordination problems in “bat-
tle of sexes”-type of situations. In this case deliberation is always non-
harming as it reduces the possible outcomes of the voting stage on Pareto
optimal equilibria (Calvert and Johnson, 1998). Secondly, a rather young
approach suggests that deliberation explores new information by providing
analogies allowing members to ”structure” their information base in a new
manner, leading to more efficient decision making. Finally, deliberation may
influence the information aggregation process on the individual level. An in-
dividuum, no longer restricted on its private information but having knowl-
edge on the outcome of a straw vote, will alter its voting behavior if the straw
vote reveals information on the private signals of the others.
In fact, Coughlan (2000) shows that committee members do honestly
reveal their private information in such a straw ballot if members’ preferences
are sufficient close to each other and that members condition their final vote
sincerely on all revealed signals. The defect of the unanimity rule detected
by Fedderson and Pesendorfer (1998) based on strategic voting is cured by
deliberation.3
The present paper adds to the discussion about committee decisions by
introducing members’ who “want to be right”. Such preference may be a
psychological predisposition. Another reason for such a decision motive are
job market concerns. In distinction to the literature cited above it is assumed
that committee members do not maximize a common payoff but try to max-
imize their outside reputation of being a “good decision maker”. While all
decision makers still follow the same preferences in the sense of what is a
right or wrong decision, their private utility no longer depends on the imple-
mented aggregated decision of the committee but only on the correctness of
her own decision and its observability by the outside world. Do job market
concerns play a crucial role in real world voting situations? Obviously not
and Feddersen (2002), Gerardi and Yariv (2002), Doraszelski et al. (2002), Coughlan
(2000), Calvert and Johnson (1998) Austen-Smith (1990a,b).
3However, this result is based on the specific deliberation form, which results in com-
plete information revelation of all members. Therefore, deliberation closes the gap between
the preferences of a pivotal member and the common interest.
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always, but more often than one thinks in the first place. Take for exam-
ple the American jury system in legal trials one of the common examples
used by the literature. If jury members gain a positive utility by keeping
their jury position and if their ability to evaluate trials is monitored by re-
viewing earlier decisions our model applies. A second broad application can
be found in firm’s board decisions, where the ability of board members to
choose efficiently between different alternatives, i.e. investment opportuni-
ties, is part of their core capabilities as manager. Obviously, the chances to
remain part of the board or even to get promoted will strongly depend on
her earlier ability to draw decisions correctly.4 Related to our approach are
Levy (2004, 2005) and Visser and Swank (2005). To model career concerns
Levy (2004, 2005) introduces an extra agent, an evaluator, who forms beliefs
about consultants’ and committee members’ ability, respectively. She then
proceeds studying the motives to ’anti-herd’ and the effects of transparency
of individual decisions. Visser and Swank (2005) concentrate on the weight
committee members put on reputation. We are less explicit in our model
and use the short cut that committee members ”want to be right”. We fo-
cus on optimal majorities and the effects additional external signals have on
committee members voting behavior.
The paper proceeds by presenting the a simple model of committee de-
cisions. Thereafter, we derive some results based on the more common idea
of committee payoff maximization as a benchmark. We then compare these
results with those when committee members ”want to be right” with and
without a public signal. Before concluding, we discuss in what respect com-
munication among committee members and the hiring of consultants fits into
our model.
2 The Model
We analyze a committee whose members have to vote on whether a certain
project is implemented or not. We denote the two possible states of the
4There is also a literature where agents (experts) provide advice to a single decision
maker. Job market concerns are much more common in those models. See for example
Scharfstein and Stein (1990), Ottaviani and Sorensen (2002, 2003).
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world by s ∈ {0; 1}. In state s = 1 the project is a success if implemented
and it has a net social payoff S > 0. In state s = 0 the project fails if it is
implemented and the social payoff is −L < 0 where L denotes the net loss
the project generates. A project not implemented generates a net profit of
0. The a priori probability that a project is a success is π. If not stated
otherwise, results below are presented for the case of π ≥ 0.5.
We follow Sah and Stiglitz (1988) by introducing the quality of potential
projects by:
β =
(1− π)L
πS
(1)
A smaller β implies a higher expected project profit. A β = 1 implies that
if the project is always implemented then the expected return equals zero.
Before the committee votes, nature decides about the state of the world.
The committee consists of n members. For a career motive to make sense,
we assume that members come with heterogeneous abilities. Members are
with probability h of high quality type ph and with probability 1 − h of a
low quality type pl. To reduce the number of symbols, we also denote the
probabilities to receive a correct signal as ph, pl: each committee member
gets an independent signal σ ∈ {1, 0} about whether the project will be
a success or not which is correct with probability ph, pl respectively. We
assume that the error probability is the same for both states of the world5:
Pr(σ = s) = Pr(σ = 1 |s = 1) = Pr(σ = 0 |s = 0) = pk and Pr(σ 6= s) =
Pr(σ = 1 |s = 0) = Pr(σ = 0 |s = 1) = 1 − pk. Signals are informative
(ph > pl > 0.5). It is not known, neither to the outside world nor to (other)
committee members, who or how many members of the committee are of high
ability. With respect to the knowledge of a member about his own ability
we will consider both cases, i.e. it will be stated below whether members
know about their ability or not. Denote by q = hph + (1− h)pl the ex ante
probability that a given committee member gets a correct signal. Whenever
studying the case of members not knowing their own type, q represents the
5This assumption simplifies the notation. State dependend propbabilies do not change
the result as long as ph types get in both states of the world a more informative signal.
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quality of their signal. This case is equivalent to homogeneous committee
members.
Independent of the members’ knowledge about their own type, the plan-
ner setting the majority rule does not know the members type, hence he must
base his decision on q and if necessary modify the rule based on expected
voting behavior.
We denote by vj the vote of a committee member. If member j votes
for implementation of the project then vj = 1 else vj = 0. The variable
x = Σnj=1vj represents the number of votes in favor of the project. An
exogenous planner sets a rule x such that whenever x ≥ x the project will
be implemented. The planner maximizes the expected social payoff given the
behavior of agents and we denote the optimal rule by x∗ : x∗ = maxx Pr(x ≥
x |s = 1)S − Pr(x ≥ x |s = 0)L.
Motives6: We want to study the effects of career concerns on voting be-
havior given a majority rule x and how an optimal majority rule changes. We
assume that member want to be right, that is committee members maximize
the probability to vote correctly, i.e. to vote in favor of implementation if
s = 1 and to vote against implementation if s = 0. Thus member j0s utility
function can be written as:
Uj(s, vj, x) = Pr(vj = s). (2)
We refer to this specification of member’s utility function as a career
orientation because under many assumptions such a utility function replicates
the decisions taken by a member who cares about beliefs of the outside world
about the member’s type. To see this assume that independent of whether the
project is implemented or not the true state of the world will be revealed after
the vote is taken. Denote by Bj(s, v, x) the outside belief about the quality
type of manager j. For illustration assume all managers in equilibrium reveal
6 A large share of the existing literature (on information aggregation) assumes that
committee members maximize social success. Formally, committee members maximize
the expected social payoff Pr(x ≥ x and s = 1 |σi, I)S − Pr(x ≥ x and s = 0 |σi, I)L
where I represents a vector of any additional information about the state of the world and
beliefs about the information and strategies of other committee members.
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their signal, then the belief will be the probability that a certain manager is
of high quality given his signal, i.e. B(s, v = σ, x) = Pr(M = ph |v = σ, s).
In this case B(s, v = s, x) > B(s, v 6= s, x). Whenever the latter inequality
holds then a member that maximizes the beliefs of the outside world about
its own quality will maximize our utility function. To provide two examples,
the following two assumptions on the outside world’s beliefs guarantee the
stated condition. First naive beliefs of the outside world that every committee
member always votes according to his or her private signal. Second under the
assumption of symmetric and non-constant strategies the condition holds.
The Public Signal: Each member of the committee may receive an
additional informative public signal about the state of the world. Denote
this signal by Φ ∈ {1,0} with Pr(Φ = s) = ϕ > 0.5.
Timing: We assume the following timing: 1. the planner sets x; 2.
nature determines s, σ , Φ. 3. members cast their vote; 4. the project is
implemented if x > x; 5. the true state of the world is revealed.
Solution concepts: Given that committee members care only about
being right, the analysis of their decisions is of decision theoretic nature.
Regarding the game between the planner and the committee member we
apply the game theoretic concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
3 First Best Qualified Majorities
Sah and Stiglitz (1988) analyze the optimal decision rules if homogeneous
committee members just report their signal. They look at the case where
each member of the committee has the same ability to raise information (i.e.
gets a correct signal with the same probability). Under the condition that
signals are revealed, optimal decision rules, i.e. optimal qualified majorities,
are characterized. The basic idea is the trade-off between a type I and a type
II error. We do not report these results here, nonetheless, we follow their
ideas to find similar rules for our setting. Note, in contrast to Sah and Stiglitz
we restrict ourselves to one probability to receive a correct signal, they look
at the case where the probability of a signal in favor of a project depends on
the state of the world, i.e. the probability that a member receives a positive
signal in case of failure is in their case not necessarily equal to (1− pj). Our
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simplification does not affect the results but the results of Sah and Stiglitz
results will help us below in the analysis.
For the first best we assume that each member just reveals his signal
honestly. This leads to the following probability αs( x) that the project will
be accepted given the state of the world s (s = {0,1}) and the majority rule
x:
α1( x) =
nX
i= x
µ
n
i
¶
qi(1− q)n−i (3)
α0( x) =
nX
i= x
µ
n
i
¶
(1− q)i qn−i (4)
with q = (hph + (1− h) pl). The terms (1− αS( x)) and αL(x) can be
respectively interpreted as the type I and type II error entailed in the com-
mittee’s decision making.
The expected social payoff of a x majority rule is given by:
πα1(x)S − (1− π)α0(x)L (5)
The profit given in equation (5) can be monotonically transformed by
dividing with πS and substituting β:
α1( x)− βα0( x) (6)
As Stiglitz and Sah (1985) have shown in the discussion paper version of
the 1988 article, the profit is single peaked in x. Therefore, a unique solution
exists for an optimal level of consensus.
The consensus level x which maximizes equation (6) (and therefore also
the expected social payoff given in equation (5)) will be denoted by x∗.
For the purpose of comprehensibility some fundamental results of Sah
and Stiglitz will be adopted to our model.
Lemma 1 Interior Solution: If β < 1 (low risk project) than the optimal
consensus level is equal or less than majority ( x∗ ≤ n/2). If β > 1 (high
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risk projects) than the optimal consensus level is strictly above the simple
majority ( x∗ > n/2). If β = 1 the majority rule characterizes an optimum
( x∗ = n/2; the only further optimum is x∗ = n/2 + 1).
Corner Solution: If n ln( q
1−q ) < lnβ then never to implement is optimal.
The unanimity rule is the optimal rule ( x∗ = n) if:
(n− 2) ln
µ
q
1− q
¶
≤ lnβ
The project should always be realized ( x∗ = 0) if:
n ln
µ
1− q
q
¶
≥ lnβ
Proof. Can be found in the appendix
Given that x∗ is determined by n, q and β we use the notation x∗(n, q,β).
Sah and Stiglitz (1988) use their results to answer several questions (optimal
size of committees/ optimal decision rules). However, committee members in
their approach are assumed to reveal their signals always honestly. This may
no longer be individually optimal in our setting. Austen-Smith and Banks
(1995) provide results for the committee members maximizing the expected
return of the decision and S = L. They show that given x = x∗ socially
motivated members will reveal their signal truthfully in equilibrium. Their
argument can be extended to the case S 6= L.
4 Committee Decision when Members Want
to be Right
Members who ‘want to be right’ choose v = 1 if Pr(s = 1 |σ,Φ) > 0.5.
A single decision maker tries to maximize the probability to be right. His
behavior differs from an agent maximizing the expected payoff of the decision.
He does not take into account the relation between the damage of a wrong
and the benefit of a right decision. For them each project has a β = 1.
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4.1 Committees without a Public Signal: Herding with
the Prior
If the own type is not known and members do not have access to additional
(public) information we find the following.
Proposition 1 All decisions will be taken unanimously for [against] imple-
mentation if and only if π > q [(1−π) > q] given members “want to be right”
and neither know their type nor have access to an additional public signal. If
the prior is weaker than the private signal ((1 − q) < π < q) then members
vote according to their signal and the efficient x∗ can be implemented.
Proof. Given members maximize the probability to be right they follow
their signal as long as the signal is stronger than the prior. Otherwise they
follow the prior. Given this it follows that the optimal x∗ can be chosen if
the signal is stronger than the prior.
This proposition already reveals a potential benefit of an additional public
signal. Given that committee members do not follow their signal if the prior
is too strong, the public signal can increase the power of the private signal
such that members vote according to their signal and information can be
aggregated.
This incentive problem results in different qualified majority rules if mem-
bers are heterogeneous and know their type. In this case some members will
herd with the prior, others will follow their private signal. The planner will
adopt the majority rule accordingly.
Proposition 2 Given members know their type, ph members follow their
signal and pl members follow the prior if pl < π < ph. If pl < ph < π
[π < pl < ph] then all members follow the prior [their private signal].
Proof. Similar to the previous proof hence omitted.
This proposition states two things. On the one hand it characterizes
parameter ranges where the type of members matter. On the other hand it
states when the prior or the private signal determines members vote.
Let us next consider the choice of the optimal x∗. Proposition 3 summa-
rizes the result.
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Proposition 3 The social payoff maximizing x∗ is chosen
(i) socially optimal (x∗ = x∗) if all members follow their private signal.
(ii) either equal to 0 or equal to n+1 if members follow the prior only. The
project is either always implemented (x∗ = 0) if β < 1 or never implemented
(x∗ = n+ 1) if β > 1.
(iii) If members follow their private signal only if they are of type ph then
x∗ < x∗ if π < (1− pl) < 0.5 and x∗ > x∗ if π > pl > 0.5.
Proof. The (i) and (ii) of the proposition are straight forward: if members
follow their signal the optimal x∗ can be applied. If all members follow their
prior, the optimal x∗ is determined by β since votes and thus the decision on
implementation of the project are independent of private signals. Regarding
(iii) the proof is not as simple. Let us concentrate on the case 0.5 < pl < π.
Thus pl types will always vote in favor of implementation (for the case of
0.5 < pl < 1− π the pl types will always vote against the project). Denote
by
eqS = hph + (1− h) (7)eqL = h(1− ph) + (1− h) (8)
the ex ante probability that a given member votes in favor of the project
given s = S, L respectively. We are now in the situation studied by Sah
and Stiglitz (1985 and 1988) where p2 6= (1 − p1). We can calculate the
probabilities that a project is implemented in case of success of failure as
done above in equations (3) and (4). We denote these by
eαS( x) = nX
i= x
µ
n
i
¶eqiS(1− eqS)n−i (9)
and
eαL( x) = nX
i= x
µ
n
i
¶
(1− eqL)i eqn−iL . (10)
We follow the proof of Sah and Stiglitz (1985) to show that the expected
profit πeαS( x)S − (1− π)eαL( x)L is single peaked in x.
For the social optimal x∗, the corresponding terms for qs and ql are qs =
hph + (1− h)pl and ql = h(1 − ph) + (1 − h)(1 − pl). This implies that the
12
Type I error is decreasing and the Type II error is increasing compared to
the social optimal majority rule due to the strategic behavior of pl members.
This ascertains the higher/lower majority compared to the socially optimal
rule.
The first part states the situation without a herding problem. The sec-
ond part states the optimal majority given members herd with the prior.
The intuition of the third part of the result is that for the case that the pl
members of the committee herd with the prior the optimal rule maximizes
the payoff by optimizing the majority of a virtual committee consisting of
the expected number of ph types with an ex ante signal quality of q = ph.
Note, the loss of expected welfare in the latter committee is not only the
loss of non-informative votes but also that the optimal rule can only condi-
tion on the expected number of qh types. Due to this random effect some
projects get implemented which should not be implemented (whenever the
realized number of qh types is larger then hn) and some are not implemented
(whenever the number of qh types is below hn).
4.2 Committees with a Public Signal
In this section we only consider the case of homogenous committee members
(or member not knowing their own type). As stated above, a public signal
can help to avoid a herding with the prior. On the other hand, given that a
public signal is public - similar to the prior - herding with the public signal
is a potential cost of it.
The next two lemmas characterize the strength of a prior such that a
public signal helps to overcome the herding with the prior, or that it causes a
problem of herding with this signal. We only study the case were members do
not know their ability, i.e. homogeneous committee members. Heterogeneous
members open up several cases, similar to those studied in the previous
subsection, without adding new insights. Remember we state our results
for the case of π > 0.5.
Lemma 2 There exists a critical value π for any given ϕ such that if π < π
and the committee member gets a public signal reinforcing his private signal
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then member j votes always according to his private signal. Furthermore
π > q .
Proof. If the private signal, the prior and the public signal reinforce each
other the statement is obvious. The critical case is where the private signal
together with a positive public signal overrule the prior. π follows from
Pr(s = 1 |σ = 0,Φj = 0) = (1−π)qϕ(1−π)qϕ+π(1−q)(1−ϕ) < 0.5 ⇔ π < π = qϕqϕ+(1−q)(1−ϕ)
. If π < π then members follow their private signal when the public signal
reinforces their view. Given ϕ > (1−ϕ) it can easily be verified that π > q.
Lemma 2 states that for q < π ≤ π where before herding with the prior
took place now members with a signal that is reinforced by the public signal
follow their own signal. Thus, the lemma states the benefits of a public
signal. Next, we look at the costs.
Lemma 3 There exists a critical π such that if π <π then members always
vote according to the public signal only. Furthermore π ≤ q
Proof. This time, the critical value is determined by the case where the
private signal and the prior coincide (by assumption π > 0.5 and σ = 1) but
the public signal weakens the private signal (Φ = 0). π is characterized such
that for all π <π Pr(s = 1 |σ = 1,Φ = 0) = πq(1−ϕ)πq(1−ϕ)+(1−π)(1−q)ϕ < 0.5 ⇔ π <
π = (1−q)ϕ
q(1−ϕ)+(1−q)ϕ andmembers always follow the public signal. Given ϕ ≥ 0.5
it is obvious that π ≤ q.
Lemma 3 characterizes for which π committee members whose private
signal coincide with the prior do not follow the public signal. In the case
where the public signal coincides with the prior the herding problem is even
worth (but, the probability of an error is smaller than without the public
signal). Note, however the herding with the public signal is only an issue if
π < q that is, when herding with the prior is no problem. In this situation
the public signal has not potential benefit, the planner my choose to avoid
it.
With respect to the optimal decision rule, the following proposition sum-
marizes the two lemmas.
Proposition 4 Only for π< π < π divergent signals can be observed if pri-
vately oriented committee members receive a public signal. Thus only for
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π< π < π a qualified majority can generate higher expected social payoffs
than the maximum payoff that is generated by a never implement (x∗ = n+1)
or asking for an unanimous decision (x∗ = n or x∗ = 0) rule.
Proof. It follows from the lemmas that in all other cases either herding with
the prior or herding with the public signal takes place. For π outside this
range decisions will always be taken unanimously thus the expected payoff
of any majority rule is at best as high as the payoff of an unanimity rule or
a never implement rule.
The proposition states the benefits and costs. Whenever the prior is
strong, a strong public signal can help to reestablish that at least a majority
of members follow their signal. But if the public signal is too strong then
private signals and the prior are overruled by the public signal. Whenever
one of the two forms of herding takes place, qualified majority rules lose
their bite. Decisions will always be taken unanimously for or against the
implementation of the project and thus no qualified majority will generate
higher expected social payoffs then a rule asking for unanimity. If herding
with the prior takes place the competing rules are always (x = 0) or never
implement (x = n+ 1). If herding with the public signal takes place asking
for unanimity is equivalent to any other majority rule hence the choice is
never (x = n + 1) or always (x = 0) to implement or to implement if at
least one member votes for the project. In the last case always none or all
vote for the project hence any 1 ≤ x ≤ n yields the same expected payoff
. It depends on the strength or efficiency of the public signal and the prior
whether to never or always implement or to set any qualified majority (for
example an unanimity rule).
5 Interpreting Public Signals: Consultants and
Communication
In the previous section, we just talked about public signals. In this section,
we want to discuss our two main interpretations for such signals. We start by
an example from company decisions, namely the hiring of consultants. We
then turn to an interpretation of communication among committee members.
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5.1 Consultants
Hiring the strategic advice of consultants is one of the main services provided
by consultants.. Furthermore, it is not unusual that members of consultancy
firms are hired by companies for their board of directors. This observation
supports the view that committee members are very similar with respect to
their expertise as the hired consultant. Thus often the public signal supplied
by the consultant is not different from a private signal of a board member,
but, the consultant need not fear about his career in the company and he
may know less about the prior of the decision to be taken.
Our normative results also imply that a management board should not
always hire the most informative consultants.. If the informativeness of the
public signal is too strong, herding with this signal will take place, even if
the aggregated information within the committee may be better than the
public signal. More explicitly, if committee members are well informed a
weak public signal may help to overcome the herding with the prior problem.
That is, in the present model, to hire an appropriate consultant, one that
provides a signal of appropriate strength - neither too strong not too weak,
is advocated.
5.2 Communication of Committee Members
If information is generated by the deliberation among committee members,
than this can also be interpreted as an additional public signal. Formally,
one may think of a straw vote where the qualitative decision (but not the
exact result) becomes known to all committee members. Or, a subgroup
of members of the committee are chose to make statements such that all
members receive some information about the information that is available to
others.
Technically the following may describe a public signal based on commu-
nication. Each member of the committee receives an additional public signal
about the private signals of the other committee members. Denote this signal
by Φ ∈ {1,0} with Pr(Φ = 1 |σ1, ..,σn) = g(σ1, ..,σn). All members receive
the same signal. We assume that communication is not faulty but not all σi
need to affect g(.). Furthermore the communication signal is informative for
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all members of the committee, hence g(σ1, ..,σi = 1, ..,σn) ≥ g(σ1, ..,σi =
0, ..,σn) ∀ i ∈ {1..n} and Pr(Φ = s) > 0.5. To be sure Φ is informative for
all members we assume that ∀i ∈ {1, .., n}∃k 6= i, k ∈ {1, .., n} such that
g(σ1, ..,σi, ..,σk = 1, ..,σn) > g(σ1, ..,σi, ..,σk = 0, ..,σn). Examples for ag-
gregation processes we have in mind are Pr(Φ = S |σ1, ..,σn) = Pr(
nP
i=1
σi ≥ n2 )
or Pr(Φ = S) = Pr(
kP
i=1
σi ≥ k2) with k < n. In the former example the pub-
lic communication signal depends on all private signals in latter example
it depends only on a subset of private signals. We rule out communication
processes where only one signal is aggregated because this committee member
then receives an empty signal.
In the previous analysis, we denote by ϕi the updated probability that
the communication signal is correct ϕi = Pr(Φ = s |σi) . The assumption that
the communication signal is informative for all committee members implies
ϕi > 0.5. Note however that ϕi, depends on the private signal and on how
the private signal of i enters into Φ. The arguments given in the previous
section remain valid if the condition holds for ϕ = min{ϕ1, ..,ϕn}.
This is a simple (reduced) model of public communication. Nonetheless,
it captures many forms of communication by simply stating that communi-
cation can either reinforce or weaken private informations. For example if
members are able to observe a subset of the private signals, i.e. some selected
members make statements during the committee meeting then such a public
signal can be captured by our model. Similarly, if an internal pre-vote among
members is taken before the main vote and members reveal in this pre-vote
their signal honestly then our model of communication fits. Coughlan (2000)
shows that honest voting in such an internal straw vote forms a Nash equi-
librium given that the result of the straw vote cannot be observed by the
outside world. One can also describe a situation where the atmosphere of
the meeting is driven by the private signals. We assume that the communi-
cation signal is for all members informative hence weakens or strengthens for
each member his or her own private signal.
Given the results of the paper, one may observe that it is not always
optimal to let members communicate if they are privately oriented? The
comparative statics of proposition 4 provide the answer. If projects are such
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that the prior, i.e. the public opinion about the probability of success, is not
too strong then it is better to interview members separately and aggregate
their signals afterwards. The problem here is, that committee members will
not easily be separated given their own interest to communicate. On the
other hand, whenever there is a strong prior that a project will be a success
or a failure then communication alleviates the problem either completely or
at least partly. For a medium range of priors it will be possible to apply
qualified majorities to maximize expected social payoffs. For larger priors
at least a strong communication signal can reveal that a majority of private
signals are in favor of implementation and the planner can choose to follow
the signals aggregated through the communication or to never implement the
project.
If committees serve for more than just one decision, it will depend on the
distribution of π over all potential projects that may come up for decision
whether one should let them talk or not.
6 Conclusions
We studied the effects of private motives or career concerns on decision mak-
ing by committees in the framework of Sah and Stiglitz’s (1988). The optimal
decision rule is affected by the orientation of committee members.
Furthermore, we are able to describe the reasons for and against the
use of an additional public signal by committee members when committees
serve purely the objective of aggregating informations. Status and career
oriented members would not follow their own signal if priors are too strong.
Communication can make them revealing their signal if the private signal
receives enough support by colleagues through the communication process.
The costs are that herding with this communication may take place.
7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. The conditions for corner solution are omitted since
they are obvious (they are available from the authors on request). For the
18
interior solution one of the following conditions must hold (one of them strict,
as shown in Sah and Stiglitz (1985)).
α1(x
∗)− βα0(x∗)− α1(x∗ + 1) + βα0(x∗ + 1) ≥ 0
α1(x∗)− βα0(x∗)− α1(x∗ − 1) + βα0(x∗ − 1) ≥ 0
These two conditions are equivalent to the following two conditions (fill
in the formulas, rearrange, take logarithm):
(n− 2x∗) ln
µ
1− q
q
¶
≥ lnβ (11)
(n+ 2− 2x∗) ln
µ
(1− q)
q
¶
≤ lnβ (12)
Putting pieces together it follows (or just replace p1 = q and p2 = 1− q
in equation (50) in Sah and Stiglitz (1988):
(n− 2x∗) ln
µ
1− q
q
¶
≥ lnβ ≥ (n+ 2− 2x∗) ln
µ
(1− q)
q
¶
(13)
Since q ∈
¡
1
2
; 1
¤
it follows that ln (1− q) /q < 0. If β is strictly less than
one (lnβ is negative), x∗ must be strictly less than n/2 + 1. Otherwise, a
contradiction exists on the right hand side. This proofs the first part of the
lemma.
If β > 1, then x∗ must be strictly above n/2. Otherwise, the left hand side
is contradicted. If β equals one, lnβ equals zero. Because of the right hand
side follows: x∗ ≤ n/2 + 1. Because of the left hand side follows: x∗ ≥ n/2.
Therefore, x∗ must be n/2 or n/2+1. In fact, one can show that both allow
the same profit.
The conditions for corner solution are omitted since they are obvious.
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